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Abstract: This paper examines the evolution of global governance and the 
changing position power and authority in the contemporary international system. 
The paper reviews five recent edited collections which have attempted to grapple 
with this complex, evolving terrain and argues that for all the growing importance 
of civil society and non-state actors, states remain critically important components 
of the new international order. 
 
A revised version of this paper will appear in the Australian Journal of International 
Affairs. 
 
Although there is still a good deal of debate about the origins, extent and ultimate 
impact of ‘globalisation’, most observers agree that the intensity, complexity and 
variety of contemporary transnational flows, processes and interactions mean that 
there is something novel and distinctive about the present era (see Held et al 1999). 
More than a quarter of a century ago Keohane and Nye (1977) produced a path-
breaking book which described a form of ‘complex interdependence’ that emerged 
from processes we now associate with globalisation. Importantly, Power and 
Interdependence highlighted the blurring of the domestic-foreign policy divide, and 
the array of new non-state actors that was becoming a prominent part of 
‘transnational’ relations. At the beginning of the twenty-first century many of the 
trends they identified have consolidated and spawned a burgeoning literature 
subsumed under the rubric of ‘global governance’.  
 
All of the books reviewed here are concerned with global governance in some form or 
other, although there are some significant differences in emphasis. What is common 
and revealing, however, is that every volume is an edited collection. This is not to say 
that there haven’t been some important single-authored contributions to the field of 
governance studies (see, for example, Reinicke 1998; Rosenau 1997; Young 1999), 
but the very diversity and complexity of the potential component parts of global 
governance seem to lend themselves to this sort of multi-author analysis. The books 
are generally distinguished by the celebrity or otherwise of their respective 
contributors and by the range of case studies they employ. All of them can be 
recommended as useful introductions to a complex topic although, as we shall see, 
some are more coherently organised and theoretically innovative than others. 
However, the sheer number of volumes addressing broadly similar themes suggests 
that global governance is a concept whose time has come. 
 
Theorising global governance 
 
Governance has long been staple of the political science literature, and has been 
employed to describe of the ‘self-organizing, interorganizational networks’ which, in 
addition to governments, help to authoritatively allocate resources, exercise control 
and coordinate social activities (Rhodes, 1997) At a time when some observers 
believe that the extent and complexity of cross-border economic interactions make 
some sort of transnational coordination and cooperation between individual 
governments a functional necessity if the processes associated with globalisation are 
to operate successfully (Cerny, 1995), then it is perhaps unsurprising that the concept 
of governance would take on a global dimension.  
 
In the introduction to Global Governance, Rorden Wilkinson details the array of new 
actors that have assumed prominent positions in the international system, and argues 
that it is the way these actors ‘combine to manage …a growing range of political, 
economic and social affairs’ that is one of the distinctive qualities of global 
governance, even if it is a process that is as yet not ‘complete and fully coherent’ (p 
2). A degree of caution in the claims made about the extent or significance of global 
governance is a noteworthy quality of most of the contributions to these volumes. The 
very subtitle of the collection edited by Cooper et al – Towards a New Diplomacy? – 
is indicative of the mixture of circumspection and qualified optimism that pervades 
many of the essays. Readers – and the contributors to Enhancing Global Governance, 
for that matter – might have been better able to make a judgement about the possible 
extent, novelty and usefulness of ‘new diplomacy’ as a concept had it been more 
unambiguously spelled out at the outset. Given that most of the essays in this 
collection are connected in some way to the United Nations it was never clear – to this 
reader, at least – whether the ‘new diplomacy’ was in some way limited to, or driven 
by, UN-sponsored initiatives, or whether it was emblematic of a more generalised 
transformation in global processes.  
 
One of the ‘key arguments’ of Enhancing Global Governance is that the sources of 
‘innovation and initiative’ in the international system are ‘being transformed’ (p 5). 
This claim is substantiated through a number of case studies that detail how new 
actors and issues are influencing policy outcomes. There is a degree of repetition here 
– no less than three chapters cover issues revolving around the movement to ban land-
mines – which may be illustrative of the limited number of success stories available. 
Indeed, as Cameron concedes in his analysis of the process that culminated in the 
Ottawa Treaty  prohibiting the use and production of such weapons, ‘the uniqueness 
of the issue, the fortuitous circumstances surrounding the ban movement, and the 
willingness of key players to go way out on a diplomatic limb’ (p 83), mean that it is a 
case study with limited wider implications. Likewise, Nossal’s excellent analysis of 
the use of sanctions against Angola and its lucrative diamond trade comes to the 
sobering conclusion that ‘it seems unlikely [that] had countries of greater 
consequence been the targets [of sanctions] we would have seen such unanimity  in 
the efforts to create smarter, sharper, and stronger UN sanctions’ (p 264) 
 
Other chapters in Enhancing Global Governance that consider the relationship 
between the United States and the UN remind us why the influence of the latter 
organisation has frequently been constrained by the actions of powerful states - which 
is why most analysts of global governance focus on other actors and employ different 
conceptual frameworks to make sense of the new realities. Although the contributors 
to Taming Globalization are also concerned with creating ‘adequate structures of 
global governance’ that will allow globalisation to be ‘reconciled with democratic 
principles and social justice’ (p 9), they operate on a larger canvas than Cooper et al. 
In some way this is unsurprising, as this rather slim volume contains some of the 
biggest names in contemporary social science. Robert Wade spells out why market-
centred globalisation has done little to alleviate chronic patterns of inequality and 
poverty, Joseph Stiglitz tells us how it might all be different if some of the most 
prominent agencies of transnational governance like the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank were less influential,  Robert Goodin reminds us why we ought 
to care about it, and David Held suggests how ‘cosmopolitan multilateralism’ might 
provide the basis for a new international order. Whether readers find Held’s ideas 
inspirational, Utopian or just unlikely, his claim that the continuing absence of more 
inclusive, accountable and effective strategies for dealing with globalisation’s all too 
tangible inequities could lead to its ultimate failure is one that needs to be taken 
seriously if interdependence is to be sustained. The period between the two World 
Wars serves as a powerful reminder that there is nothing inevitable or irreversible 
about continuing globalisation (see James 2003). 
 
Accountability and governance 
 
The other two substantive chapters in Taming Globalization are by John Ruggie and 
Robert Keohane, and provide an important theoretical dimension to the overall 
volume. Ruggie revisits the concept of ‘embedded liberalism’, first articulated  in a 
highly influential and much-cited essay more than twenty years ago (Ruggie, 1982). 
The essence of the earlier version of embedded liberalism was the claim that a trade-
off existed between economic openness and national autonomy: states agreed to 
greater international economic integration as long as they retained a capacity to 
manage the domestic social impacts of liberalising initiatives. As Ruggie points out in 
the new essay, such an implicit agreement was predicated on the idea of discrete 
national economies managed by relatively autonomous states. However, the 
transnational restructuring of corporate activity and the growing influence of 
international financial markets ‘threatens to leave behind merely national social 
bargains’ (p 94). Ruggie’s surprising and optimistic conclusion is that corporations 
will play a key ‘bridging role’ between an increasingly global economy and national 
communities. Whether business has the capacity or, more pointedly, the desire to take 
on this sort of role is a moot point, but Ruggie rightly highlights the gaps in 
transnational governance structures that traditional, nationally based-political actors 
seem incapable of addressing (see, Strange 1996). 
 
Keohane’s chapter is concerned with the implications that more globalised patterns of  
governance may have for accountability. The disjuncture between nationally-based 
polities and unelected, generally non-transparent, but highly influential transnational 
institutions, and the latter’s concomitant capacity to corrode democratic principles, is 
one that has long been recognised (Held, 1995). Keohane’s particular concern reflects 
both his interest in international institutionalisation and his underlying assumption 
that ‘the vision of global society is a mirage’ (p 136). For Keohane, at least in the 
sphere of ‘complex interdependence’, or the dense networks of economic and political 
connections that characterise much of the industrialised world, future governance 
structures will continue to be dominated by states, but they will share power with non-
state actors. Elsewhere, ‘coercion and bargaining’ rather than ‘persuasion and 
emulation’ will be the norm, and fundamentalist rather than democratic values are 
likely to predominate. At the very least, Keohane’s chapter serves as a salutary 
reminder that the preoccupations of these volumes are predominantly those of the 
‘developed’, industrialised, rich world. Much of the developing world participates in 
global governance either at the margins or under a regulatory regime laid down by the 
United States and a handful of other countries(Woods, 2002). Nevertheless, Keohane 
concludes that ‘the world needs more multilateral governance not less’ if powerful 
state and non-state actors are to be held accountable. 
 
Although Keohane wants to argue that multilateral organisations like the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are, 
in fact answerable to both governments and a wider array of civil society actors, he is 
forced to concede that ‘in the last analysis they are in fact accountable, through 
internal processes, only to a few powerful states and the European Union’ (p 145). 
Indeed, as Keohane notes, this lack of broadly-based accountability is even greater in 
the case of non-state actors like multinational corporations and transgovernmental or 
private sector networks. This lack of accountability and the question of precisely 
which organisations or actors are able to make authoritative decisions about the 
allocation of resources is consequently at the centre of contemporary theoretical and 
policy debates. To their credit, both of the other volumes under review here take 
seriously the questions of power and authority that the growing prominence of non-
state actors and inter-governmental organisations raise. Both provide sophisticated - 
and in the case of Political Space – quite innovative conceptual frameworks with 
which to try and make sense of the new developments. 
 
Geography and governance 
 
The editors of Political Space borrow a number of concepts developed primarily by 
geographers in an effort to avoid the ‘territorial trap’. The primacy attached to the 
nation-state in the practice and conceptualisation of international relations has led to a 
preoccupation with nationally demarcated spheres of economic and political activity. 
The possible theoretical limitations of such an approach have been especially apparent 
to political-economists, who have drawn attention to the way global forces have 
effectively undermined the idea of discrete national economies. The most forceful and 
persuasive statement of this possibility in these volumes actually appears in The 
Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (hereafter EPAGG),  where 
Stephen Korbin outlines the impact of economic globalisation on nation states, the 
rise of the networked economy, and their combined impact on geographic space 
which, he argues, is ‘losing meaning as the basis for the organisation of markets’ 
(EPAGG, p 46). While both Political Space and EPAGG are concerned with the 
implications of these developments, Political Space contains some of the most 
ambitious theoretical attempts to get to grips with it. 
 
The editors’ introductory essay in Political Space provides the most complete attempt 
to delineate a conceptual framework for, and description of, the terrain upon which 
nascent practices of global governance unfold. In this context, global governance 
becomes  
 
‘not so much a reference to the control exercised by effective authorities on a truly global 
scale, than a concept that invites investigators of political space in today’s world to map 
the patterns and consider the source(s) of whatever order and compliance they may 
observe’ (p 8). 
 
Central to this endeavour is the recognition that the line between the public and 
private sectors is blurring and that governance ‘emanates sometimes from discrete and 
identifiable actors, but as often as not, from their complicated relationships on various 
levels’ (p 9). These themes and the open-ended nature of the research project provide 
the basis for a number of exploratory essays by some very prominent international 
relations theorists: K.J Holsti examines the problem of change; Richard Little 
provides a comparative historical context with which to make sense of contemporary 
realities; the editors, Robert Latham, and Stewart Corbridge all provide separate 
considerations of some of the theoretical implications that flow form reconfigured 
political space. Other, more mundane, space considerations prohibit a detailed 
consideration of all of these chapters. A couple of the contributions to this volume are, 
however, worth briefly highlighting. 
 
One of the most interesting chapters in this collection is by John Agnew, a prominent 
geographer, who has been responsible for some of the most innovative attempts to 
link the generally separate concerns of space and power (see, for example,  (Agnew 
and Corbridge 1995). He continues this endeavour here and concludes that power is 
always historically realised and contingent. In short,  
 
…power is not a fixed in given territorial units but changes both its character and spatial 
structure as different geographical scales (local, regional, national-state, world-regional, 
international and global) change their relationships to one another as the political 
practices of the global geopolitical order change’ (p 115). 
 
This approach, which self-consciously eschews the idea that power is synonymous 
with or can be ‘reduced to state territoriality’, provides a way of thinking about the 
complex, multilevel, and spatially distributed nature of power. It also highlights the 
way power relations have evolved over time. The key point that emerges from this 
sort of analysis, and which is implicit in many of the contributions to these volumes, 
is that the nation-state is but one form and location of power, and a fairly recent, 
historically contingent one at that. Indeed, if the global governance debate does 
nothing else, it should alert us to the fact that there is something distinctive and 
different about contemporary patterns of transnational interaction and we need to 
develop ways of thinking about them that reflect this underlying reality. 
 
Revealingly, some of the most important contributors to contemporary debates about 
governance and globalisation come from outside of the discipline of International 
Relations. Saskia Sassen, for example –a sociologist – has become one of the 
foremost analysts of global processes and their spatial and political implications. (So 
prominent is she, in fact, that she also appears in EPAGG ). Her major concern in this 
essay is the way in which formerly national governance functions are being 
‘denationalised’ as regulatory responsibility shifts from the national to the 
transnational, and from the public to the private sector. One of the most important 
consequences of the new patterns of interaction between states and private sector 
market actors is, Sassen argues, the creation of a ‘new normativity that attaches to the 
logic of global capital.’ (p 178). The idea that particular values associated with 
‘Western capitalism’ might come to dominate economic and even social activity is 
hardly new (Strange 1990). What is becoming clearer, however, is that the regulatory 
role that business has increasingly assumed is establishing enduring standards and 
patterns of behaviour through formal instruments like patents and intellectual property 
law, and by modelling business practices, which in turn become pervasive norms that 
exert an influence over economic and ultimately political practices (Braithwaite and 
Drahos 2000). Importantly, states are playing a crucial role in adjusting their own 
internal administrative architectures and practices in line with the functional 
requirements of globally-oriented business - and frequently handing greater power 
and authority to business as a consequence. 
 
Authority and governance 
 
These processes are often subtle and difficult to recognise or make sense of as they 
become part of everyday reality at multiple levels. One area in which we might expect 
to see opposition to the pervasive influence of business is in ‘global civil society’. 
Given the attention this idea has received in the scholarly literature and the potential 
role some see global civil society playing in new structures of global governance 
(Keane 2003; Lipschutz 1992), the concept is given surprisingly little attention in 
these volumes (although see Lipschutz and Fogel in EPAGG). While it is important to 
remember that not all of the actors in civil society are associated with ‘progressive’ 
causes or necessarily agents of political liberalisation (Morris-Suzuki 2000), it is clear 
that NGOs in particular have assumed a prominence and ubiquity that makes them 
potentially important parts of new governance structures.  
 
James Rosenau (1992;1997) has played a major role in popularising and explicating 
the idea of global governance and his analysis of the role of NGOs in international 
system makes it clear why ‘it seems inconceivable that the interstate system is still the 
sole arbiter of the course of events’ (p 266). This volume generally and this chapter in 
particular should be compulsory reading for the – depressingly large – number of 
international relations scholars who persist in producing relentlessly state-centric 
analyses of contemporary events that pay perfunctory, if any, attention to the new 
patterns of international interactions in which non-state actors play such a major part. 
One of Rosenau’s most important contributions in this collection and elsewhere has 
been to show how authority – be it associated with state or non-state actors - can be 
decisive in determining political, economic and social outcomes, and how the power 
to act authoritatively is not simply a function of the formal position of an actor or 
agency. Rosenau details the various types of authority – moral, knowledge-based, 
reputational, issue-specific, and ‘affiliative’ – which underpin the habitual patterns of 
compliance that distinguish authority relations, and which help to account for the 
distinctive patterns of governance that characterise the contemporary international 
system. The significance of authority relations is given an even more prominent place 
in EPAGG. 
 
For the editors of EPAGG authority refers to the ‘institutionalised forms or 
expressions of power’ (p 4). The problems of accountability identified by Keohane 
and others are brilliantly dissected by A. Claire Cutler who has produced some of the 
most original analyses of the private-public interface and its implications for 
governance regime (Cutler, 1999). Here she points out that  
 
efforts to hold private institutions accountable are bound to flounder, for that which goes 
unrecognised is difficult to regulate…The legally formalistic associations of authority 
with the state function ideologically by depicting the world not as it is, but as it ought to 
be [p 24, emphasis in original]. 
 
Cutler details the way in which corporations have effectively created legal and 
regulatory regimes to create commercial law, or the sort of regimes that have been 
created under the auspices of intergovernmental organisations like WTO. In effect, 
she argues, ‘firms are basically functioning like governments’ (p 32). This process is 
not made any easier to understand because governments are frequently willing 
partners in this shift of regulatory responsibility. As Louis Pauly points out in his 
examination of the regulation of global finance, ‘blurring the boundary lines between 
public and private is part of an intentional effort to render opaque political 
responsibility for the wrenching adjustments entailed in late capitalist development’ 
(p 77). Put differently, governments are able to claim that their systematic abnegation 
of responsibility for the basic welfare and compensatory functions that were once 
considered central components of the post-war settlement are inevitable, inescapable 
responses to the ineluctable logic of ‘the markets’. There are two obvious problems 
with such a claim: first, if governments are no longer autonomous or capable of 
regulating key elements of the international political-economy then their legitimacy is 
fundamentally undermined. Second, the financial sector demonstrates just how 
dangerous it can be to rely on ‘self-regulation’ and ‘the market’ to determine 
economic outcomes in a sector that is dominated by a handful of vested interests (see 
Beeson, 2003a). 
 
Global governance: Déjà vu all over again? 
 
Most of the contributions in the volumes under consideration here focus on either the 
political aspects of governance or on  the underlying processes of economic 
restructuring and integration that are influencing the way governance occurs. As a 
consequence, there is an understandable preoccupation with new actors and modes of 
interaction. There is also a noteworthy - and welcome – recognition that the state is 
neither the only nor even always the most important agent in processes of governance 
that are increasingly dependent on other actors. This is not to say that states are 
becoming redundant or powerless, as some of the more breathless accounts of 
globalisation would have us believe (Ohmae 1996). On the contrary, there have been 
a number of persuasive, recent analyses of contemporary governance and state-market 
relations that have suggested that state power might actually be enhanced by 
processes associated with globalisation (see Kahler and Lake 2003; Weiss, 2003). Of 
course, such analyses are - like most of those considered above - almost exclusively 
concerned with those governments that posses a high degree of ‘state capacity’, or the 
ability to formulate and implement policy in response to economic restructuring and 
competition. Many states in the developing world have neither the internal state 
capacity to respond to such pressures, nor the ability to influence the wider 
international system that effectively shapes the rules of the governance game. As with 
so many other aspects of globalisation, governance is a highly uneven, spatially 
differentiated, and power-laden process that reflects enduring political, economic and 
even strategic asymmetries. 
 
It is noteworthy that the continuing importance of strategic issues is a striking lacunae 
in these collections. Only Enhancing Global Governance takes this potentially 
decisive element of global governance seriously. Even then, only one author, Ramesh 
Thakur, explores security issues in a systematic way. Significantly, Thakur points out 
that the United States’ increasingly unilateral foreign policy poses major problems for 
multilateral diplomacy and intergovernmental organisations like the UN, which seek 
to manage transnational relations and problems. While this tendency may have been 
most dramatically highlighted in the recently strained relations between the US and 
the UN, it is also important to recognise that this growing predilection for 
unilateralism and the direct application of state power is also happening in economic 
relations. The US’s pursuit of bilateral trade agreements, for example, is not only at 
odds with the idea that economic agreements and regulation will inevitably become 
more multilateral and multi-actor, but it is a reminder that the most powerful states 
retain critical sources of leverage that they are not averse to using (Ravenhill 2003). 
This is especially the case when strategic imperatives – the ‘war on terror 
notwithstanding – have released the US from the need to indulge former Cold War 
allies (see Beeson 2003b). 
 
There are, therefore, some important continuities as well as a number of novel 
features subsumed under the rubric of global governance. True, there is an array of 
new actors that have become integral components of the international political 
economy and the regulatory superstructure that attempts to govern transnational 
commerce. At the same time, however, the international system is characterised by 
continuing disparities of power, influence and capacities to take part in, never mind 
actually influence processes of global governance. While the emergence of NGOs and 
other actors from civil society may be welcome, potentially emancipatory, and 
something scholars need to factor into their depictions of contemporary international 
relations, this should not blind us to fact that some states remain pivotal actors in the 
international system and that global governance is - at this stage, at least - a shorthand 
for a number of processes and relationships that are likely to become more important, 
but which continue to be powerfully mediated by states. Indeed, if some of the 
gloomier prognostications about a world regressing to a struggle over diminishing 
resources prove correct (Hirst 2001), then discussions about global governance may 
prove somewhat redundant. Yet in the foreseeable future, Rosenau may be right that 
the emerging world order will ultimately become so decentralised and multicentric 
that it will ‘not lend itself to hierarchy or coordination under hegemonic leadership’ (p 
263). If he is correct, we may be witnessing the beginning of the end of unipolarity 
and the attempt by one state and its subordinates to impose itself on the international 
system. Getting from here to something that actually looks like global governance 
could prove the tricky part, though. 
 
Acknowledgement: thanks to Alex Bellamy for commenting on an earlier version of 
this paper. The usual caveats apply. 
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